

SELEUKID STUDY DAY VII
‘Warfare, Military & Society in the Seleukid Kingdom’
(Sunday, 28 July to Sunday, 4 August 2019)

Abstracts

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Plutarch (Life of Demetrius) and Others on the Battles of Ipsos and Kyrrestika

This paper aims to re-discuss the depiction of the Battles of Ipsos (301) and Kyrrestika (285) as they are found in Plutarch’s *Life of Demetrios* (chs. 28–29 and 48–49 respectively), the main or only source for both military engagements. It purports to explore the information provided by Plutarch and to offer a reconstruction of the battle’s stages, in particular with regard to the feasible role (and number) of elephants employed. This conjecture will be made also with relation to proposals concerning Plutarch’s ultimate source as a means to better understand the battles. A comparison will be made with the descriptions of Ipsos by Diodoros (and scattered details found in other authors) and of Kyrrestika by Polyainos. One of the points to be made is the extent to which Plutarch’s depictions echo each other and serve as a literary closure in his work: the first battle saw the end of Antigonos, the second the political end of Demetrios, his son. As the winner in both battles, Seleukos plays the role of the protagonist’s rival and limit.

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The War between Demetrios I and Alexander Balas in the Light of Classical and Cuneiform Evidence

The paper is concerned with the chronology and crucial events of the war between King Demetrios I Soter and the usurper Alexander Balas. The literary evidence (*IMacc*, Flavius Josephus, Trogus/Justin and others) will be confronted with the *Babylonian Astronomical Diaries* (AD – 149 A rev. 3’14’). This will allow for a more precise reconstruction of the events. It will become clear that, in 161 SE^B = 151/150 BC = by April 150 BC, Demetrios lost his authority not only in Syrian cities, but also in some of Eastern provinces, such as in Mesopotamia. Of particular importance for the course of events was a strong famine in Antioch at the beginning of the 150 BC. Although this put Demetrios under heavy pressure, Alexander was still defeated in the first major battle. The second battle took place soon afterwards, probably in May/June of 150 BC. Both sides suffered tangible losses, but Demetrios was killed either in or soon after this clash.

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The Pisidians between Seleukids and Ptolemies

We know that Pisidians have been enrolled in the Ptolemaic armies, for example during the Syrian Wars, mainly thanks to contacts happening in Pamphylia or in Cyprus. But, according to epigraphic sources, the Pisidians were also involved in the Seleucid military affairs in central Greece, notably in Boeotia at the times of Antiochos III. Based on mainly epigraphic evidence, we will examine the presence of Pisidians in Boeotia between the 220s and 190s BCE, with a particular focus on a proxeny decree from Tanagra (*IG VII 508*). Antiochos III besieged Selge in 193, Polybios reported his action in Boeotia and Euboea in 192–191, then Pisidians were part of the Seleukid army at the Battle of Magnesia, so that we may assume close relationships between the king, the Pisidians, and central Greece.

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The King, His Subject Peoples and His Army Units: Aspects of Ethnic Identity (Construction) under the Seleukids in the 2nd Century BC

When Achaimenid kings went to war, they assembled enormously large armies that were counted in hundreds of thousands. Structured after the several ‘nations’ that were under the king’s sway or bound to him as vassals, they represented the multi-ethnic empire of the Persians. More important than any particular fighting skills of certain contingents was the overwhelming impression that such an army was supposed to make: its sheer size should inspire fear and awe of the Great King. The effect was not only geared towards his enemies, but also towards his subjects, whether they took part in the campaign and saw this manifestation of his nearly unlimited power, or whether they stayed home, knowing that a significant part of their leaders and fighters were being held hostages. At a first glance, the famous procession organized by Antiochos IV Epiphanes at Daphne in 166 BC may convey the impression that the Seleukid Kingdom worked in similar ways. Several different ethnic units paraded before an even more diverse audience, celebrating the might of the king and the universal admiration he was enjoying. But, on closer inspection, several differences emerge: while the Macedonians figured prominently, the subjects of the two core regions, Syria and Mesopotamia, were nearly invisible, although they must have been included in some of the other ethnically-defined units, as most recent research has rightly suggested. At the same time, other ‘national’ divisions, such as the Galatians, Mysians or Cretans no longer represented peoples under the rule of the king, after Antiochos III had to cede Asia Minor in 190/88 BC. To a varying degree, such units may still have originated from ethnically-defined recruitment, but they were most likely of heterogeneous consistency by 166 BC, as was obviously the case for the contingent styled as Roman legionaries. The present paper calls for a more systematic exploration of ethnic identity and identity construction among the fighting units of the Seleukid army.

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How the Jews Saw the Seleukid Army (1 and 2 Maccabees)

1Macc and *2Macc* are the only sources presenting in some details the campaigns of Antiochos IV and other Syrian kings against Jews in the 2nd century BC. For this reason, both works are important historical sources. Both accounts devote a lot of attention to picturing the Seleukid army. Usually, for historian working on Seleukid military history, the essential question is that of the credibility: how reliable are their presentations of the military aspects of the Syrian-Jewish confrontations? The aim of this paper is to pursue the question how the Jewish authors of *1Macc* and *2Macc* looked at the Syrian army in their works and how far their personal emotions affected their pictures of it.

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The Seleukid King as Leader of the Army – Patterns of Glory and Disasters. Case Studies on the Impact of the Presence of the Hellenistic Kings on the Battlefields

In 222 BC, when rumours about the possible secession of Molon, the satrap of Media, came to Antioch, the Seleukid king Antiochos III Megas summoned his friends to take council with them. One of the army commanders, Epigenes, urged that the ‘[...] first and most important thing was that the king should proceed to the provinces and personally take charge of the situation. In that case [...] if the king was there and the enemy soldiers could see that he had brought an adequate army – either Molon would not dare to make trouble at all, or if he persisted with his rebellion and did try to take military action, he would soon be seized by his troops and handed over as a prisoner to the king.’ (Polyb. 5.41.6–9). His advice was not followed through, and the king went on to fight another battle in Koile-Syria. The aim of the present paper is to examine this and similar cases, in order to ‘measure’ the effect of shock at the appearance of the Hellenistic kings on the battlefields. How relevant for success was the physical presence of the king? How did it influence military tactics and the construction of the royal image in the Hellenistic Age from the 3rd to the 1st centuries BC?

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Towards an Intellectual History of the Seleukid Empire

When speaking about the ‘intellectual history’ of Classical Athens, Republican Rome or Late Antiquity, even the neophyte to Classical history will be capable of delineating their general trends and tendencies and of showing how philosophy, religion and historiography and art were inseparably linked to each other and subject to a same general evolution. Even the intellectual history of the Ptolemaic Empire, coalescing in the fertile productions of the Alexandrian scholars and artists, has been reconstructed in its broad outlines. However, when it comes to the intellectual history of the Seleukid Empire, most scholars would have considerable difficulties in sketching its general evolution. Given the lamentable state of our sources, this is, of course, no surprise; however, it is amazing that no endeavor has yet been made to at least determine this general field of enquiry. The proposed paper will try to remediate this situation not only by presenting what little information we have about the broader evolution of ‘Seleukid’ intellectual history, but also by taking into account the situation of the late Achaemenid and the early Arsakid Empires which may give some precious information about the general trends which must have taken place in between.

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Once again on the Galatians in Seleukid Army: the Case of the Rhigosages

Much has been speculated about the origin of the *Galatai Rhigosages*, whom Polybios (5.53.3) reports as serving Antiochos III in 221 BC. But the most obvious solution should be to identify them with another, much better known Galatian tribe, the *Aigosages*. As we also know from Polybios (5.77, 111,2), the latter migrated from Thrace to Asia Minor by 218 BC. The two names are paleographically very similar, and it seems that the form *Rhiosages* results from a mistake of the historian himself, his source or a scribe. This re-evaluation will also support the reconstruction of the events that could lead to the employment of the Galatians from Europe in the Seleukid army. Further relevant in this context is the role of Hieron, the sanctuary of Zeus Urios on the Asian shore of the Thracian Bosphorus. As it seems, Seleukid control over this important fortress (Dion. Byz. 92; cf. Polyb. 4.52.2–3) could be established at first by the aid of the Thracian Galatians (=Aigosages) in the course of Antiochos II’s Thracian campaigns in 250s BC (Dion. Byz. 92). Later Hieron could serve for the Seleukids as a stronghold on the strait and a center for the recruitment of Galatian mercenaries from Europe up to the 220s. BC, when it was sold to the Byzantines.

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A Shield with the Depiction of a Seleukid Anchor in Patara

When the theatre in Lykian Patara was rebuilt between the 3rd and 5th centuries AD, a wall of recycled materials was erected there to separate spectators’ seats from the stage/arena. At least two stone blocks with the depictions of cuirasses and swords at their faces were installed in this wall. In the publication of this theatre, these blocks were dated to the time from the second half of the 1st century BC to the early-1st century AD without any arguments. However, it is worthwhile exploring the possibility of an earlier date and connecting them with the history of Hellenistic Patara. Block A, now extracted from the wall, also preserves images on its right side: a helmet and a shield adorned with anchor. Undoubtedly, the two blocks were originally parts of the same structure, probably a pedestal of a monument or a sculptural group. In antiquity, the anchor was first and foremost associated with the Seleukid dynasty. But its depiction on the shield of block A differs in its proportions and details from its more ‘canonical’ shape. This seems to speak against the view that the building to which those blocks belonged was erected during the occupation of Patara by Antiochos III in 197–189 BC. Most probably, the monument celebrated the liberation of Patara and Lykia from Antiochos III. The weapons were thus shown as trophies, and the anchor symbolized the defeat of the Seleukid king by the Romans and their allies.

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Features of the Third Syrian War in the Egyptian Hieroglyphic Sources

In 2011, the corpus of the sources on the Third Syrian War increased by an Alexandrian priestly decree of 243 BC which details the lands allegedly reached by Ptolemy III in 246–245. Among them there is Susiana and a land of %(n)gr (Babylonia) in the hieroglyphic or Prs (Persis) in the Demotic versions of the text. These are the designations of the former Achaemenid metropolitan area comprising both Western Iran and Mesopotamia. If so, this claim stands in line with the enumeration of subdued territories in the *monumentum Adulitanum* and might indicate Ptolemy's quest for allies against Seleukos II there. The Alexandrian Decree does not mention %Tt/%tt ("Asia"), the hieroglyphic term for the interregional Near Eastern empire as that of the Achaemenids, Argeads or Seleukids, although this was the standard notion for the hostile realm to the north in earlier and later Ptolemaic hieroglyphic texts. A possible explanation is that Ptolemy was claiming to have established sovereignty over this empire in 246, followed by a peace with Seleukos in 241. Accordingly, Ptolemy's campaign was less represented as a confrontation with "Asia" than as its political integration into his kingdom. Indeed, the same message is implied in the *monumentum Adulitanum*, which speaks of his authority as far as Baktria, the easternmost part of that interregional empire. The last point is that the Kanopos Decree shows rather definitely the causes and the program of *sedition domestica* (Just. 27.1.9) that forced Ptolemy III to stop his Asiatic campaign: a reference to earlier epochs of Egyptian history (OGIS 56, ll. 13-15; cf. hier. ll. 7-8, dem. ll. 15-16) suggests that a part of the Egyptian elite used the low floods of the Nile and ensuing food shortages to prove the incapability of the Ptolemies as ritual kings and the need to replace them.

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Patterns of Post-Conflict Settlement within the Seleukid Kingdom during the 3rd and 2nd Centuries BC: Continuity, Adaptation, or Disintegration?

This paper aims at assessing how the measures of post-conflict settlement exercised by the Seleukid administration developed through the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC. Particular emphasis will be on dynastic policies facilitating consolidation after instances of internal unrest. While numerous studies on Seleukid politico-military history have examined the causes and events of internal revolts, there is a clear void within modern scholarship regarding the aftermath of these revolts. Both the available corpus of epigraphic material and administrative literary sources relating to post-conflict diplomacy can be examined within two specific instances of the kingdom's military history – the revolt of Antiochos III's cousin Achaïos in western Asia Minor (ca. 213–205/4 BC) and the early stages of the Maccabean Revolt (ca. 168 – ca. 167 BC). After the defeat of Achaïos, the Seleukid governor-general Zeuxis implemented the billeting and garrisoning of Sardeis and further the settlement of soldiers throughout Lydia and Phrygia. (*SEG* 39.1285, ll. 6-8; *Jos. A.J.* 12.3.4 [147-153]). Similar measures were carried out in the aftermath of Jason's riots. Antiochos IV Epiphanes established a garrison himself and had it reinforced by Apollonios the Mysarch a bit later (*IMacc* 1.29-40; *2 Macc* 5.11-16; 5.23-27). While the territorial re-stabilisation of Lydia and the rest of Asia Minor provides a seeming model example of these resolute practices, the measures in Judaea ultimately failed. This raises the question whether the Seleukid administration itself was ineffective or external circumstances determined the unsuccessful outcome.

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See under Strootman

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Seleukos I and the Origin of Seleukid Dynastic Ideology

This paper will try to show that build-up of the Seleukid dynastic ideology went through a tortuous path during the long reign of Seleukos I. Its most important components are imagery borrowed from Alexander the Great, legitimacy of Seleukos as an heir to Alexander and the particular protection afforded to Seleukos by Apollo, his divine father. The first is best documented by Seleukos' coinage whose imagery follows, broadly speaking, the same line as

that of Alexander's coinage. The second is anchored in the spurious testament of Alexander, best known from the *Alexander Romance* and the *Liber de Morte Testamentoque Alexandri Magni*. This early Hellenistic source enshrined Seleukos' rule in Babylonia in Alexander's disposition of his empire. It was probably absorbed by the Seleukid court chronicle which gave origin to the presentation of the line of succession from Alexander to Philip III Arrhidaios to Seleukos I to Antiochos I, known already to Berossos. It represents a version of history in the age of Successors that differs from the historical mainstream, being popular nevertheless in Eastern historical accounts from the Hellenistic age until the early middle ages. The idea of special ties between Apollo and Seleukos came quite late, no earlier than 299 BC. It is connected with Apollo's great temple and oracle at Didyma. It was promoted by Demodamas, a general and friend of Seleukos and an influential citizen of Miletos. Through his offices, Seleukos and Antiochos provided financial support to the Milesian temple of Apollo of Didyma, who in turn recognized his son in Seleukos. The special ties between Apollo and the Seleukid dynasty became the cornerstone of the Seleukid dynastic ideology for the next century and a half.

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The Art of Warfare of Early Hellenistic Baktria in the Light of the Battle at the Arios River (208 BC)

The Battle at the Arios River (now known as Herirud/Tedzhen flowing through modern-day Afghanistan and Turkmenistan) is described in more or less detail by Polybios (10.49). It was fought between the armies of the Seleukid king Antiochos III the Great and the Graeco-Baktrian ruler Euthydemus I in 208 BC. Until now, historians of ancient warfare have paid unfairly little attention to this clash. Indeed, although the battle did not have any decisive impact on the course of Antiochos' whole campaign against Baktria, nevertheless, it is of considerable interest in revealing the main peculiarities of the art of war in Hellenistic Baktria. The purpose of this paper is to analyze in detail the account of Polybios and compare it with the archaeological and iconographic evidence related to Baktrian military practices from the 4th to 2nd centuries BC. This investigation should allow us to clarify aspects of the weaponry and battle tactics of the Graeco-Baktrian troops, the role, significance and composition of the native contingents, as well as the strategic thinking of the Graeco-Baktrian commanders.

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Coalition Warfare and the Battle of Ankyra

Sometime after Antiochos II died, a fierce military conflict, called the Fraternal War, ensued between his two sons, Antiochos (Hierax) and Seleukos II. This military confrontation shattered Seleukid prestige and was immediately exploited by local powers, namely by the Galatians, Bithynia, Kappadokia, Pontos, Pergamon, and rulers of Armenia who joined in the fray. The primary policies of the Seleukid rulers and minor kings were not unilateral efforts but coalition policies and this implied the use of coalition military forces. Antiochos Hierax proved to be a politically gifted ruler who created a powerful alliance including Mithradates of Pontos, Ariarathes of Kappadokia, Zialeas of Bithynia, and Arsames of Armenia. Antiochos hired an army of Galatians, and showed himself an enemy towards his brother (Just. 27.2.6–12). The battle of Ankyra, a major confrontation of the royal brothers, was fought in the very first years of their Fraternal War, probably in 244/243. In this battle, not only the famed Galatians but also the troops belonging to Mithradates of Pontos acted as vanquishers of Seleukos II.

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Cretans Soldiers at the Seleukid Court and the Enigmatic Case of Lasthenes: from μισθοφόρος to ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων

Cretan mercenaries had been present in Greek armies from early on. Ktesias (F 13.30), for instance, attests them as fighting on the side of the Athenians in the Second Persian War. During the Hellenistic era, independent city-states, such as Rhodes, and the Successor kingdoms, such as the Ptolemies and the Seleukids, hired significant numbers of Cretans. Between the reign of

Antiochos III (223–187 BC) and the second half of the 2nd century, Cretans were consistently present in the Seleukid army. The aim of this paper is to analyze the evolution of their roles as mercenaries in the Seleukid army. The political and military crisis of the Seleukid dynasty in the mid-2nd century gave the Cretan mercenary commander Lasthenes an opportunity to take a key position at court, becoming ὁ τῆς βασιλείας προσπηκτικός of Demetrios II, as Diodoros reports (33.4.1). Prior to this, the higher levels of the Seleukid administrative and military structures were mainly formed by nobles and relatives strictly bound to the kings. The elevation of Lasthenes to the top position within the royal administration appears to be symptomatic of the erosion and social change of the kingdom's elites. Moreover, the paramount importance of mercenaries in this period is also hinted at in the coinage of the usurper Diodotos Tryphon (142–137), whose issues depicted horned helmets that have been linked to Aegean and Cretan mercenaries. From these and other examples, it is obvious that the Cretans gained a central role at the Seleukid court and throughout the kingdom of Syria.

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The Seleukid Campaigns against John Hyrkanos: a Chronological and Geopolitical Revision

At some point after 130 BCE, the Judaeian ruler John Hyrkanos (135–104) launched one or several campaigns that ended with the conquest of the Idumaeian and Samaritan territories as well as the forced judaization of their populations. The chronology, context and purpose of these events have been revised on several points in recent years. Our main source is Flavius Josephus, who addresses the events in his *Judaeian War* (1.2.5–7 [61–66]) and *Judaeian Antiquities* (13.9–10 [254–281]). He states that the Hasmonaean ruler accomplished his conquests immediately after his return from Antiochos VII's expedition to the East in 129. Nonetheless, studies of coin hoards found in Samaria and Idumaea raise doubts to Josephus' chronology. In particular, coin hoards from the years 113/112 to 108/107, which reflect campaigns of either Antiochos IX Kyzikenes or VIII Grypos, seem to contradict the view that there had been an earlier phase of Judaeian occupation beginning in the early 120s. The late chronology is therefore the predominant view today, but it is not without problems either. This study will confront the two main options and explore their potential political, geopolitical and strategic implications. The focus will be put on the internal conflicts between the Seleukid rivals, which cannot be easily reconstructed based on the testimony of Josephus. But I shall also argue that the numismatic evidence does not allow us to reconstruct a clear-cut succession of military dominance by the two main rivals, as the mainstream view is now inclined to do.

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Celtic Officers in the Seleukid Army between the 3rd and 2nd Century BC: the Case of Brikkon of Apameia

A funerary epigram found at Maroneia in 1967 commemorates a certain Brikkon, son of Ateuristos, from Apameia, who was a “commander of the Galatians”. In the early 1970s, the two names were identified as proper Celtic, thus opening the debate about aspects of Brikkon's death, social position and military role. The city of Apameia can be identified with the Seleukid settlement on the Meander in Phrygia. At first, scholars supposed that Brikkon had fought in the Chremonidean war as leader of Antigonos Gonatas' Gallic mercenaries, perhaps in a contingent dispatched by Antiochos I in support of the Macedonian king. The letter shapes, however, seem to exclude such an early date and point to the beginning of the 2nd century BC, at the time of Antiochos III's campaign in Greece. It is still not clear whether Brikkon was a mercenary or not. He may have been a regular officer of the Seleukid army, serving as an intermediary towards the Gallic and Gallo-Greek elements: in fact, as stated by his will of being remembered through Greek verses, he can be considered a good example of a hellenized barbarian integrated in a Hellenistic military system. Whether a cleruch or even a member of the court, he can barely be regarded as a mercenary or chieftain. The presence of the Galatians in the Seleukid world can be compared to other cases of socio-cultural integration, such as Ptolemaic Egypt and Massalia: attention should also be paid to the meager (and fading) presence of La Tène objects in the Galatian world.

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Second-Hand Propoganda: Polybios and Zeno on the Role of Antiochos IV at the Battle of Panion

Polybios castigates Zeno of Rhodes for his account of the Battle of Panion between Antiochos III and Ptolemy V's Aitolian commander Skopas in 200 BCE, claiming this as an example of how historians go wrong (Polyb. 16.18.1–19.11). Modern evaluation includes Walbank's suggestion that Polybios' reading of Zeno was careless, Lenfant's charge that Polybios intentionally presented Zeno's account as confused, Meister's agnostic statement that we have no way to judge the criticisms without a parallel tradition, and Bar-Kochva's claim that the Rhodian historian's mistakes were a result of his unfamiliarity with the terrain of Panion. I will maintain that Zeno's battle account does contain mistakes, but not only for the reasons that Polybios gives or the moderns hypothesize. Instead, the description of this important battle should be seen as the transmission, knowingly or not, of propaganda, as one element in the legitimization of Antiochos IV as ruler of the Seleukid kingdom. I will attempt to isolate the following layers of history and historiography: 1) the Battle of Panion; 2) a Seleukid account of the battle that featured Antiochos III, his oldest son Antiochos and Antipater; 3) a re-written Seleukid account that emphasizes the role of the future Antiochos IV; 4) Zeno's version, whether or not he realized its propagandistic slant; 5) Polybios's summary and criticism of Zeno. It appears that Polybios does not realize the full significance of his observation that there was only one Antiochos at Panion. He thus misses why Zeno's account is so full of errors.

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Liability for Military Service in the Seleukid Empire

We are increasingly becoming aware that the core elements of Hellenistic armies were not supplied by mercenaries. In the Macedonian kingdom, the King's adult male subjects were liable to conscription in time of war. Continued work on the 'Conscription *diagramma*', preserved in two fragments, the first of which was found in Drama in the 1950s, the second at Kassandrea in the late 1980s, makes it increasingly clear how this system worked in detail. In Egypt the introduction of the *katoikic* system of military settlement, was aimed at providing a pool of manpower having obligations to the Ptolemaic ruler, which could be mobilized in times of war. The system in place in the Seleukid kingdom is not so clear. Elias Bickerman (*Institutions des Séleucides*, 1938, pp. 74-88) recognised that the Macedonian phalanx fielded by the Seleukid monarchs was composed of descendants of Macedonian settlers. He thought that these were settled in a system of rural colonies, rather than in the cities of Syria. Bezalel Bar-Kochva (*The Seleucid Army*, 1976, pp. 20-48, 55-62) developed these concepts further, and postulated that the elite infantry corps of *argyraspides*, 10,000 strong, was composed of the young sons of these settlers permanently embodied. I have suggested (*The Seleucid Army*, 1994, pp. 13-14) that the usage of the term 'Macedonian' in a Seleucid context implied a defined legal status, and it was on that basis that the Seleukid phalanx was mobilized, and not as a *quid pro quo* for the receipt of a settlement plot. The purpose of my paper is to further develop this argument, and to supplement it with 'Macedonian' concepts drawn from the Antigonid 'Conscription *diagramma*'.

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New Seleukid Coins in Russian Collections

The project of cataloguing Seleukid coins from Russian Museum collections was launched in 2017 by the State Historical Museum and the Russian Academy of Sciences. The main purpose is to publish a comprehensive catalogue of Seleukid coins (including barbaric imitations and forgeries) kept by Museum and private collections in Russia. The project involves not only museums in Moscow and Saint Petersburg, but more than 40 local museums of different Russian regions. By now, numismatic collections of 14 museums have been investigated in the course of two years (2017–2019). As a result, around 200 Seleukid coins have been identified to date, including some hitherto unknown types, such as a new bronze issue of Alexander Balas.

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Ptolemy Keraunos, the Black Adder of the Hellenistic World

After his victory at Korrupeidion (281), it looked briefly as if Seleukos might reunite Alexander's empire, until a thunderbolt struck, and that thunderbolt was named Ptolemy Keraunos. Raised as heir to the throne in Alexandria, he ended up ruling from Pella, because his younger half-brother displaced him from the Egyptian throne. Keraunos fled to Antioch with his widowed sister Lysandra and persuaded Seleukos to make war on Lysimachos. He assassinated him soon after his victory, trying to seize the entire empire, no doubt planning full revenge upon his half-brother. That opportunity never came, and all of Asia slipped out of his grasp, although Antiochos I had his hands full with numerous rebellions to exact revenge upon Keraunos. Instead, the latter exacted revenge upon Arsinoë, killing her son in front of her and sending her back to Egypt. His false gestures of peace to his rival in Alexandria unwittingly came true, but only because he never had time to break them. He treated with Nikomedes to avoid a war with Bithynia and with Pyrrhos to end the strife between Epirus and Macedon. Most consequentially, he loaned Pyrrhos "5,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 50 elephants, but for not more than two years' service," (Just. 17.2.14 in a controversial passage), suggesting that he was planning to use those troops in 278. Contrary to plans, Keraunos soon acutely needed those troops and elephants in 279, when the Galatians invaded Macedon. They caught him short-handed, decapitated him and paraded his head around Macedon on a pike as a warning to those who would resist. Keraunos had caused countless deaths in the hope of reuniting Alexander under his own rule, but ultimately paved the way to restoring the three-polar Hellenistic Age system of Macedon, Syria, and Egypt, which lasted the next 125 years.

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Mysian Soldiers in the Seleukid Army

According to Polybios, a unit of 'Mysians' was part of the procession organized by Antiochos IV Epiphanes at Daphne in c. 166 BCE. Their presence has puzzled historians. In 188 BCE, the Treaty of Apameia had prohibited the recruitment of troops in Asia Minor; Mysia moreover was at that time the territorial base of the Attalid Dynasty. Various solutions have been proposed: these Mysians may in fact have been Attalid troops who had been 'lent out' to Antiochos; the Treaty of Apameia was binding only for Antiochos III, not his son Antiochos IV; they were not actually Mysians but mercenaries armed *as* Mysians. In this paper, we will try to identify these and other 'Mysians' in Seleukid armies. Using also evidence from the Achaimenid period, we argue that their identity was for a large part based upon a real background in the mountainous interior of Northwest Anatolia. We argue that the population of this region (which was hardly controlled by the Attalids) sometimes operated as a 'warrior people', from which Hellenistic armies recruited units.